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This paper is mainly concerned with one aspect of the agrarian transition to 
capitalism: namely, the use of political power in the restructuring of class 
relations in the countryside. The accumulation and control of capital, together with 
the reshaping of productive relationships, account for the startling transformation 
of Free State agriculture in the decade following the Anglo-Boer War; and this was 
essentially the result of the imperial intervention. The transfer of large quantities 
of capital into the settler econony and the establishment of a more effective 
coercive apparatus were necessary preconditions to the transition to capitalism; and 
these were effected by the extension of imperial sway. Althou& the transformation 
was delayed by the reconstruction after the war-time devastation, suld altho- it 
stopped short of thorou&-going proletarianization of labour power, the experience of 
the Free State during these years was nevertheless traumatic. 
In the aftermath of the war, the devastation of Boer farms and herds and 
the shortage of liquid capital in the settler econony contrasted sharply with the 
accumulations of stock andl agsicultursll egdpment in African hands. (1) Agricultural 
prices and wage levels were inflated during the war as a result of the greatly 
augmented demand. Great quantities of stock, having been dispersed throughout the 
countryside, were gathered together and herded over the border into Basutoland with 
ease. Looting of abandoned farm-houses was widespread. Thus blacks, although uprooted 
from the farms, had unprecedented opportunities for capital accumulation. However, 
Basutoland, where the bulk of Free State Africans settled when hostilities began, had 
been experiencing population pressures for some years. Deforestation and overg'razing, 
together with the very considerable influx of population during the war, led to the 
rapid spread of d o w s  throwout the territory. The war  probably saw the peak of 
Sotho prosperity, but also the acceleration of the processes of class differentiation 
and soil deterioration. (2) The consequence was that, once peace had returned, the 
ravaged B'ree State, denuded of stock and crops, seemed to many Sotho to be the natural 
area for expansion. Hence a form of colonizing movement across the Caledon set in. 
The economic leverage of black peasants was much greater than before the Mar. The 
white farmers welcomed with open arms any black family with stock and equipment who 
could plough and sow. In return for a share of his crop, the African cultivator had 
opportunities that were closed to him in overcrowded Basutoland. Thus the share- 
cropping system became the predominant feature of farming throu&out the arable 
districts of the Free State. Although conditions of tenure were, at least at first, 
hi@ly favourable, the white fanners regarded the system as a temporary expedient in 
the wake of the war and the subsequent prolonged drought, in anticipation of the 
rehabilitation of demesne farming and the recapitalizing of the settler sector. 
Moreover, in the immediate post-war period, when the countryside was still 
very unsettled, when farmers' preoccupations were naturally with compensation payments, 
relief grants and military receipts, many farms, in all districts, that would normally 
have been owne>occupied, were left unsupervised for considerable lengths of time. 
Share-cropping, a system which required no organizational control, thus suited all 
parties in the countryside. In this, the OR2 experience is strongly reminiscent of 
the American South after the Civil War. Further, farmers who had roots outside the 
colony, of whom there were a great many in the more fertile districts, and who had 
family connections or private finances available outside on which to fall back, were 
slow to return to the colony after the end of hostilities. These landowners 
frequently nominally let their land to a white bywoner, who would then act as a 
"frontgg while the independent black peasants cultivated the soil, and handed over a 
share of the crop as rent to the owner's representative, perhaps the local trader. 
The same system was followed (as it had been before the war) by landowners with more 
than one fanu - but in such cases the rentier farm was used as often as a labour 
reserve as for share-cropping, although frequently for both purposes. 
A marked feature of the post-war situation, however, was %he rapid 
proliferation of small white-owned farms. The number of farms in the colony was 
largely augmented by some 700 to 800 British land settlers on state land, much of 
which was newly acquired. W i n g  the post-war boom in land prices, many land 
speculators chose to sell out to the Government, whose land evaluators were themselves 
landowners, and inclined to inflate valuations. ( 3 )  Also, large-scale farmers, 
faced with a shortage of liquid capital, were obliged to sell off portions of their 
hol- to provide themselves with investable funds. FurLher, there was a sudden 
spate of sub-divisions of holdings in the wake of the war, as the sons of those who 
had died in combat apportioned the inheritance in accordance with Boer custom. (4) 
A11 these factors served to accelerate the process, evident for some years, whereby 
the sizes of white-owned fa,rms tended to diminish, and the number of farm~l to 
proliferate. The implications for labour demand and for squatter communities were 
considerable, as we shall see. 
Nevertheless, after the war there were still large absentee-landlord estates 
to be found, particularly but not exclusively, in the north-eastern districts. A 
steady (indeed inareasingi income from hi&ly competitive and prosperous peasants was 
for many, in terms of opportunity cost, a more attractive proposition than the sinking 
of capital into what was still an unstable market. Much Natal capital was tied up in 
this axes in the nineteenth century, and, with the commercial boom of the L880s, much 
of the land had been turned into summer grazing land for Natal farmers. However, 
large squatter communities remained on rentier estates despite the widespread clearances 
of the 1880s, and many of the displaced people had taken the opportunity of the war to 
return from Z u l u l a n d  to land they regarded as their own. (5) 
In the Transvaal after the war, the British soon found that there were still 
very considerable barriers to the effective capitalization of agriculture. H u g e  
tracts of land were still in the hands of powerful land compaxies and land speculators; 
the pressing need to hold food prices down lent to black cultivators a degree of 
immunity from harassment; the prevalence of animal diseases after the war had 
debilitating effects on the recovery of settler agriculture; and. the importation of 
labour, particularly from China, for the mines made the mobilization of internal labour 
supplies less pressing in the eyes of the mining houses. The so-called alliance of 
maize and gold was indeed slow in materializing north of the Vaal. The eastern half 
of the Free State, on the other hand, was the natural maize belt of the regional 
economy, &,if it could be turned to full-scale capitalized production, the gceat 
expense of importing American grain would be avoided. But, despite the favourable 
conjuncture of factors in the Free Stake during the Reconstruction era, such a 
transformation takes time, as the British administration was to discover. 
Clearly, the existence of free squatter-peasant communities was an obstacle 
both to the optimum distribution of labour resources and to the capitalization of 
plantation agriculture. Those interests which had most vociferously (and successfully) 
opposed the implementation of anti-squatting legislation in the 1880s and 1890s were 
the large landowners, who regarded the limitation of tenant communities to five heads 
of family per farm as damaging to themselves. These included the rentier landlords 
as well as capitalizing fanners with considerable estates and large labour demands, 
who had sufficient land to maintain private labour reserves on which to draw. The 
British, while anxious to restructure the productive relations in the countryside, 
were careful not to stand on the toes of large landowners, for whom squatter 
c o ~ t i e s  were an invaluable source of labour and income. Clearly it was the 
large landed interest which the British relied on for support and collaboration, and 
they were most sensitive to pressws from that quarter, 
At first, with the optimism of the uninitiated, the British set about 
attempting to enforce the 1895 anti-squatting law. However, they soon came up hard 
against the stern dissent of the vested interests. For example, one Sir John 
Swinburne, who farmed a considerable estate of 9,368 acres near Albertine Station, 
launched a vigorous correspondence with the Colonial Office, alleging that squatter 
families on his land had been given notice to quit. He alleged that 
natives from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and the 
Portuguese Territories on the east of the Transvaal, 
are prevented from settling in the Orange River 
Coloq, and consequently the country, and farming, 
cannot be developed owing to the want of labour. (6) 
The truth was that only large landowners, like Swinburne, had the land resources to 
maintain their own private labour reserves. Nevertheless, his complaint did touch on 
1 
I a matter of no small significance. One of the major obstacles to the squeezing of 
I black peasants into rendering labour-service was the black cultivator's capacity to 
l pull out his roots am3 trek on to land that offered him more independence from 
excessive rent exactions. Thus, when Swinburne alleged that blacks were simply 
declining to settle in the Free State as a result of anti-squatting laws, he was using 
a powerful argument. But what he mi&t have added, and what was becoming increasingly 
evident to the black cultivator, was that the mobility of blacks was drastically 
declining. The land frontier was soon to be reached; the alternative land available 
to blacks who chose not to sink to proleLarian status was being filled up; and much 
of it was already overgrazed and overexploited to the point of declining productivity 
and declining living standards for those who relied on it. 
Given the fact that the land was rapidly filling up with white farmers, 
that the number of white-owned f m  was increasing faster than before and the average 
size of such farms was diminishing, it was inevitable that free tenant communities 
would come under increasing pressures. Further, when more and more land was being 
turned to productive use by white farmers, where land freely at the disposal of black 
graziers was being enclosed, where black tenants, access to the means of production 
was beginning to be seen by the landowner as an obstacle to the more intensive use of 
labour power, then white resistance to anti-squatting legislation was likely to 
decline and the pro-peasant lobby was likely to disintegrate. But none of these 
factors was immediately apparent or effective in the confused years following the 
War. By 1913, when the greatest assault yet on independent black peasants was launched, 
the situation had altered; but immediately after the war the barriers to effective 
enserfment (7) of blacks in the fiee State were still formidable, although much more 
favourable than in the Transvaal. While white farming was still under-capitalised, 
while share-cropping was still widely resorted to by landowner lacking resources to 
exploit the land themselves, while so m a n y  nominally resident landowners were away 
from their land for lengthy periods, while the powerful large landed interest 
prospered from the fruits of black peasant enterprise, the British administration 
was bound to be frustrated in its efforts to effect a transformation of Free State 
agriculture . 
Thus, two conditions had to be fulfilled before effective enserfment could 
be imposed on blacks. Firstly, alternative access to the means of production other 
than on the white-owned farm had to be denied them. Secondly, an unprecedented degree 
of unanimity had to be reached within the colonial community that wage labour (or, at 
any rate, serf labour) was a more productive asset than independent agriculture by 
free peasant tenants. The first condition was rapidly being met by natural 
demographic and ecological processes. The second could be met only by injections of 
capital, of credit, of technology, of marketing and transport facilities, of advisory 
and technical services, and of protective barriers into the colonial sector; and by 
the simultaneous decline of the pro-peasant lobby. Within a decade of the 
establishment of British rule thro@out South Africa, these conditions had lazgely 
been met in the Free State, where the conjuncture of circumstances was more favourable 
to thorou& transformation than anywhere else on the Highveld. Thus it was that the 
anti-squatting provisions of the 1913 Land Act were largely inspired by Free State 
interests and aimed at Free State peasants. 
But in the meantime Sir John Swinburne and those other dissentient voices of 
which he was the most prominent were sufficiently influential to s v  the new 
administration from its course. In July 1904, a letter was sent to the commanding 
officer of the Constabulary stating: 
Strong representations have recently been made to 
the Government from different parts of the Colony 
a d  also in the Legislative Council, that the 
strict enforcement of law No. 4 of 1895 at the 
present time is detrimental to the vital interests 
of a considerable portion of the Farming Community. 
The Government is satisfied that substantial 
grounds exist for'the view ... it is desirable that 
the Law shall be administered with greatest tact 
a,nd discretion, and in fact that as little 
disturbance of the existing conditions should take 
place as possible. (8) 
This amounted in effect to an admission of defeat by the colonial administration. - 
It had had to learn an old lesson anew: that it was impossible to restructure class 
relations in the countryside by mere legislative edict or administrative fiat. 
By 1908, however, the situation in the countryside had altered significantly. 
Such was the spurt of capitalization and commercialization that followed the breaking 
of the drougkt and the end of the trade recession that once again coercive action 
aimed at dispersing free tenant communities became politically viable. 1907-08 saw 
something of a turnabout in the country's trade patterns. Not only were markets in 
Europe opening up to South African cereals (particularly maize) and citrus fruit, but 
local markets for the first time were being supplied largely by local produce. The 
agricultural import trade suffered a collapse in those years, from which it never 
recovered. (9) Land prices, which had collapsed following the government-induced boom 
of 1902-03, were rising sharply again. 
Thus, by 1908, the share-cropping system had become, in the eyes of a 
considerable proportion of the white farming population (whose political muscle out- 
weij&ed its numbers), an intolerable waste of labour-power, and an obstacle to the 
further development of the agricultural potential of the territory. Now it was the 
progressive, capitalizing farmers who were in the forefront of anti-squatting agitation, 
unlike in the 1890s when it bore the unmistakable stamp of the "little mant1 who felt 
himself threatened by black affluence and competition. (10) The ideology adopted by 
the improving farmer was that which the colonial administrators brought with them on 
to the Hi&veld, and reflected the perceptions of the enclosing landlord of industrial 
England. Men's ideas of the putative society in which they live often change faster 
than the concrete conditions of their existence. Thus a process of ideological osmosis 
cemented the emerging alliance of interests between Boer landed wealth and Ehglish 
capital that was to characterize the new South Africa. Those who sought a 
reconstitution of class relations in the Free State, in which capitalist and labourer 
would emerge starkly and unambiguously from the tegwnent of pre-industrial society, 
dominated in parliament, in petitions and in the press. (11) 
An important factor in the new situation was the natural increase of the 
black population. The increasing proportion of children in black communities on the 
farms was commented on by whites. (12) This was no doubt accentuated by the ongoing 
colonizing movement out of Basutoland into the relatively fertile and less populated 
Free State. By the early ye- of Union, indeed, labour shortage had ceased to be a 
matter of burning concern to the farming population. But perhaps of greater - - .  
significance was the eqlosion in the numbers of African-owned stock after aboui 1905. 
The next half-dozen years saw good rainfall; and the virtual elimination of animal 
diseases by the administration meant that the natural checks were no longer maintained. 
Large herds and flocks could no longer be sent across the border into Basutoland; nor 
could they very easily be distributed amongst relatives and friends on nearby farms, 
as had previously been the practice. Farmers were also becoming increasingly conscious 
of stock breeds as a result of the administrationfs policy of importing pedigree and 
thoroughbred animals for breeding. Thus they were no longer prepared to allow 
intermingling of their own stock with squatters'. Not may farmers were prepared to 
imitate Major Gent of EETomstad, who hired farms to accommodate his squatterst 
cattle. (13) 
This situation was exacerbated by the ongoing decline in fam sizes. Sub- 
divisions anongst heirs and lessees were still very common in the northern and north- 
eastern districts, where most of the larger absentee-landlord estates were to be 
found. (14) Thua, many large compact African communities settled on rentier estates 
were being evicted from the land. Now that these districts were in direct rail 
contact with the Rand, much of the land was being turned to productive use. Farmers 
who wished to clear land of squa-tter communities required no law to oblige them to do 
so. Dr Charles Garnett of the League of Universal Brotherhood claimed, in August 1909, 
that several of the chiefs of these unfortunate people were being compelled to break 
up their homesteads "and become wanderers on the face of the earth ... thus making 
them homeless and exposing them to peat hardships and privations". (15) By November, 
he estimated that nearly 1000 Africans had been "cast adrift by the Boers, on whose 
faras in the ORC they cannot find work, or a home, or even a resting-place". (16) 
Interestingly, he quoted Chief Linta Maloi1s pass, signed by H. W. Wessel~l of the farm 
Pwkhurst: llPass bearer Abram with 220 Goats and Sheep 15 Cattle 4 Horses to go and 
search for a new master. l' (17) 3. T. Gumede wrote from Ladysmith, Natal, that 
Chief Linta is being driven from one farm to another. 
We cannot find him -here now. He left his wives 
and children and his stock on one of the farms, to 
look for a place, which I am sure under the present 
circumstances, it will be very hard for him to find. (18) 
The sad story of Linta Moloi, clearly a peasant farmer of some means, was to be 
repeated innumerable times in succeeding years. Garnett put this treatment down to 
wvictimizationll, but it was the inevitable consequence of the restructuring of class 
relations in the countryside. The more cattle and sheep a black farmer had, the more 
grazing land he required; and, not unnaturally, peasant communities with the greatest 
accumulations of wealth were the first to be turned off. (19) 
Similarly, in 1910, many of the Barolong of the colony began a mass trek I 
off the lands which they had cultivated, and which were increasingly being taken over 
by white farmers intent on extending their demesne areas. They bought land in the 
south-western Transvaal by public subscription, for the purpose of establishing 
reserves on to which displaced families could move their stock and settle. (20) The 
magisterial reports for this period are full of evidence from all districts of black 
squatters being ordered to reduce their stock and increase their labour services. 
bdeed, the ELroonstad FE4 reported that he had been approached by Africans applying 
(unsuccessfully) for butchers! licences - clearly considered by those with 
entrepreneurial skills to be an answer to their dilemma. (21) Simultaneously, share- 
croppers were having their land-holdings severely curtailed, and sharing arrangements 
replaced by labour-services. However, money-wages were still exceptional for labour- 
tenants, and were to remain so for some years. 
Despite the increasing dominance of the improving capitalist in Wee State 
political life, the voice of the llpoor white" was far from submerged. The landless 
pauper, the threatened bywoner, the failing small-holder on his subdivided plot, had 
greeted the new administration with scarcely-veiled satisfaction, and had especial 
cause for profound disillusionment. Far from the natural balance between the white 
farmer and the land that he ploughed being restored, the old solidarity of Boer society 
disintegrated more rapidly than before, and the relentless advance of capitalist 
property relations pressed ever more mercilessly on the lower strata of settler 
society. (22) Inevitably, resentment was turned on black squatters, and, just as in 
republican days, popular indignation at peasant independence and affluence was 
combined with deep-seated hostilities within settler society itself. The frenetic 
populism and sharp class antagonisms that characterized Boer politics in the 1900s 
centred, as in the 1890s, on "squatting1I. 
This was a matter of critical concern to the Responsible Government, which 
felt itself threatened by the dangers to racial solidarity and stability posed by the 
growing population of indigent whites in and around the to-,swelled by the victims 
of the post-war spate of land sub-divisions. (23) This problem was tackled vigorously 
in 1908, with the establishment of agcicultural colonies (24); and the campaign 
against black squatters was seen as pla~ring a vital role in providing a solution. 
The impulse which caxmed men to consider squatting as a waste of valuable labour 
resources was the sane an that which determined them to rescue the white race from 
wdemoralizing influencesw. In a world of capital and commerce, men's place was 
defined by relations of property; and if that world was to be a well ordered one, 
class divisions must coincide with the "natural11 divide of race. 
Thus, not unexpectedly, a Bill was produced before the Legislative Assembly 
in 1908 designed to prohibit all squatting by Africans other than labo~tenants. The 
Act which emerged (25) was in fact an almost exact forerunner of the anti-squatting 
clauses of the 1913 Land Act. Hertzsg explained to the Colonial Office that the Act 
was passed in consequence of the g~eat necessity 
which is everywhere felt by the Europeans in the 
Colony to check the pernicious principle often 
followed by European landowners and occupiers of 
lands, who, being prevented by law from letting 
their lands to natives, allow the latter to 
cultivate the same on the principle of sharing 
in the yield of the harvest, a system which is 
fast resulting in the driving of the landless 
European class from the country into the towns 
where they are already forming a considerable 
class of poor whites dependent on the support of 
the Government; while the cultivation of land in 
the hands of natives, the majority of whom came 
from Basutoland into this Colony, instead of 
showing progress is more and more retrograding. (26) 
Significantly, Hertzog chose to stress the problem of white pauperism - an indication 
of the seriousness with which growi.ng class dislocation and antagonism in settler 
society was regarded. Other comment on the Act reflected much the same fear of racial 
degeneration and its implications for racial soliibxcity and the maintenance of racial 
supremy. (27) 
However, despite the strength of the forces calling for a renewed onsla-t 
on peasant independence, it would be misleading to underestimate the significance of 
the lobby opposing the 1908 Act. The very shrillness of the anti-squatting agitation 
at that time is evidence of the continuing prevalence of share-cropping arrangements. 
In certain districts such arrangements were still predominant. When the post-war 
drought broke, when prices started rising and commerce picked up, and when the grain- 
line opened up many of the richest arable districts in the colony, many farmers 
maintained the system as a cheap and relatively efficient wa;y of intensively exploiting 
the soil without risking capital investment. The share-cropper was generally brought 
much more closely under the organizational control of the white landowner, or his 
agent. Many farmers, after restarting demesne cultivation, maintained share-cropping 
arrangements alongside labour-service, thereby enjoying the best of both worlds. 
Moreover, share-cropping would often be resorted to by younger sons setting up on 
their inherited holdings without capital or equipment. 
Despite the widespread condemnation of the landowner who went in for 
nKaffir-farminglt as "physically and morally atrophied" (28), there were many who were 
prepared to come to the defence of the system. One such dissenter was G. 'Pylden of 
Ladybrand, who wrote to Lord HarrFs: 
It is chiefly in the Ladybrand district that the Bill 
will do harm and both our members voted against it. 
In theory it is excellent, but in practice half the 
wheatlands in the Conquered Territory will be thrown 
out of cultivation. Very few of us Boers . . . can 
afford to keep more than one span of oxen to plou& 
with ... it means too much capital locked up in 
animals which do not increase. This means that in 
our extremely short ploughing season we cannot bring 
a sufficient proportion of our land under cultivation ... 
He therefore gives one or more of these natives, who 
own perhaps three spans between them, a certain amount 
of land to plough. The boy finds the labour and often 
the seed, and gives the owner of the farm half the crop 
grown ... The aim of the new bill in abolishing the 
system is to assist the poor white at the expense of 
the Kafir. But as the poor white has not the requisite 
oxen the result will be that large tracts of land must 
go out of cultivation. Further, great numbers of the 
better-class natives will be forced to migrate to 
Basutoland, which is already overfull, and will 
inevitably lose their stock owing to scarcity of 
grazing, and must sink lower in the social scale with 
no chance of improving their position. (29) 
These sentiments provide a striking contrast to the increasingly dominant ideology of 
progressive capitalism, which saw the uprooting of African households from the soil as 
the only means of saving them from the dead weight of barbarism and moral decadence. 
But, there was soon to be no more room in the Free State for farmers like Tylden. 
Large-scale capitalized farming had to replace share-cropping, and the easier access 
to credit after the establishment of a Land Bank in 1908 facilitated the process. (30) 
However, the time was inopportune for the introduction of so crucial a 
legislative measure as the 1908 Act, as mamy members of the Government realized when 
it was first introduced. The National Convention was about to meet, and it was 
mutually agreed that no major initiatives on the "native problem1' should be undertaken 
by individual colonies prior to unification. The Colonial Office thus persuaded the 
ORC Government to postpone implementation of the Act indefinitely. (31) After Union, 
Hertsog, as Minister of Native Affairs, produced a Bill in parliament incorporating 
substantially the same measures. However, such was the strength of rentier interests 
in the other provinces that the anti-squatting provisions in their entirety were made 
applicable only to the Free State in the 1913 Lands Act, and were rendered ineffective 
in their application elsewhere. It would probably be true to say that nowhere else 
in South Africa was the impact of capital on the social fabric of the countryside so 
dramatic in its consequences as in the Free State. 
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